The Torpedo Attack: Questions Unanswered

By Stan Karn (November 18, 2003)

Preface

On June 8, 1967, 34 Americans were killed and 173 were wounded when air and sea forces of the State of Israel attacked the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Since that day, a controversy has raged over whether the attacking forces and/or those in command were aware that the USS Liberty was in fact a U.S. vessel. Thirty-five years later, a book written by A. Jay Cristol was published. In his book, The Liberty Incident, the author presents a great deal of discussion and evidence he contends definitively supports the official findings of both the United States and Israel, that the attack on the USS Liberty was a tragic error of mistaken identity.

This review will consider evidence presented in The Liberty Incident and will show that much of what is presented is invalid. The actual attack on the Liberty will not in itself be studied, only the validity of what is presented in The Liberty Incident will be examined. Therefore, this review does not offer any opinions or conclusions relative to Israel's knowledge of the Liberty's identity. The only conclusion reached in this review is that the controversy surrounding the attack on the USS Liberty continues without resolution.

Introduction

In The Liberty Incident, A. Jay Cristol uses two categories of arguments: he discusses topics from history that had no direct connection with the attack on the Liberty, and he presents hard evidence in the form of photos, drawings, logs and narratives of events directly related to the events of June 8, 1967.

This review will not consider the historical portions of the book. The fact that something had occurred previously is not evidence of what occurred June 8, 1967. The wide discussion on a variety of "friendly fire" incidents and (at the time) recent history within the armed forces of Israel, only appeals to the subjective opinion and emotion of each reader. They do not address the specific conditions and events of June 8. Since such "soft evidence" only addresses what could have or might have happened, there is nothing to evaluate. Only a validation or invalidation of the hard evidence presented can (should) influence a person's objective opinion on the findings of this book.

While this review tackles a relatively small portion of the book, this reviewer believes the significance of the portions discussed provide a persuasive case that A. Jay Cristol's conclusions are invalid and that the book in its entirety should have never been published.

It is suggested that the discussions in this review be read in the order in which they are presented. There are instances where a discussion on one part of the book makes use of information introduced in an earlier discussion.

The various charts presented in this review are precise. They are produced mathematically by a computer drafting program using both rectangular and polar coordinates. However, the coastline in the charts is drawn freehand only to provide an approximate reference between land and sea. The map scale is copied from The National Geographic Atlas of the World and the Latitude and Longitude of the displayed towns is found in The Columbia Gazetteer of the World.

MTB 914 Patrol

Probably the most significant evidence upon which Cristol bases his conclusions is his account of the patrol of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 914 (MTB 914). Cristol's account is essentially the following:

1120 hrs. MTB 914 leaves the port of Ashdod on a routine patrol.

1205 hrs. MTB 914, still in the vicinity of Ashdod, is ordered southwest toward El Arish, 50 miles away, at maximum speed. At this time MTB 914 is not informed why it has been ordered to El Arish.

1330 hrs. MTB 914 is informed that El Arish is being shelled from the sea.

1341 hrs. MTB 914 makes initial radar contact with the Liberty. By means of radar it is determined that the Liberty is heading west, making 30 knots at a range of about 22 nautical miles.

1347 hrs. MTB 914 calls for air support.

*1433/34 hrs. MTB 914 signals the Liberty requesting Identification.

*1434-36 hrs. MTB 914 reports the definite identification of the Liberty as the Egyptian El Quesir.

*1435 hrs Torpedo strikes the Liberty.

* The minor discrepancies in the time line are reasonably explained by Cristol.

Radar Range

In the discussion (chap. 4 pg 38) of the patrol of MTB 914 (Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 914) Cristol goes to great lengths to defend the 22 nautical mile range reported as the initial radar contact by MTB 206. Since this review will make use of the range at the time of initial contact we should consider the validity of the 22 nautical mile range reported.

Considering all of the data available, an initial range of some distance greater than 20 nautical miles does not seem unreasonable. MTB 206 made first contact at 1341 hrs. 10 minutes later at 1251 hrs the USS Liberty made its' first radar contact with MTB 914 at a range of 16 nautical miles. Factoring the speeds of the Liberty and the MTB's, the MTB's were closing on the Liberty at a speed of about 30 knots. This means that during the 10 minutes from the initial contact of the MTB's and the initial contact by the Liberty, the distance between them closed by 5 nautical miles. If we add these 5 nautical miles to the range reported by the Liberty at 1351 hrs, the result is 21 nautical miles - very close to the 22 nautical mile range reported by the MTB's.

Given the inexperience of the radar operator on MTB 206 and the errors by their CIC officer, both acknowledged by Cristol, the 21 nautical miles calculated above seems a much more reliable figure. 21 nautical miles will be used instead of 22 nautical miles in future discussion. As described in chapter 4 pgs 34 & 35, MTB 914 set out on a routine patrol. After 45 minutes, without being told why, they received orders to head toward El Arish at top speed. Not until an hour and 25 minutes later were they informed that El Arish was being shelled from the sea. Just 11 minutes after that MTB 914 made first radar contact with the Liberty. A series of technical errors then ensued which caused MTB 914 to believe they had no time to handle the situation themselves. They called for air support and the attack was underway.

We know from The Liberty Incident that at 1341 hrs, MTB 914's initial radar contact placed them about 21 nautical miles east of the USS Liberty. We learn from the Liberty's logs (in the Navy Court of Inquiry) that at 1351 hrs, the Liberty's first radar contact with MTB 914 placed them at 16 nautical miles from the Liberty at 082°T. The fact that MTB 914 made radar contact first makes sense since the Liberty presents a very large radar target compared to the very small, low silhouette of the MTB's. These two pieces of information, combined with the Liberty's logged position at 1300 hrs, allows a determination of the position of MTB 914 at 1351 hrs. This information also allows a close approximation of MTB-914's position 10 minutes earlier (1341 hrs.) when they made first radar contact with the Liberty.

[Editor's note: The IDF History Report notes that radar detection from 21 nautical miles was abnormal. The report implies that the maximum range of the radar may have been 16 nautical miles. However, the author of the report shrugs this off unquestioned.]

Extrapolating from the position of the Liberty at 1300 hrs. (steaming for 51 minutes at 5 knots on a course of 283°) places the Liberty at 31° 25.97'N & 33° 33.13'E. (See Chart 1) Plotting 16 nautical miles at 082° from that position makes the 1351 hr. position of MTB 914 at 31° 18.55' N & 33° 51.76' E.

Chart 1

A close approximation of MTB 914's position at 1341 hrs is determined by intersecting a line at 082°T from the Liberty's 1351 hr position with an arc at 21 nautical miles from the Liberty's 1341 hr position. (See Chart 2) This places MTB 914 at 31° 28.98'N & 33° 58.47'E at 1341 hrs. Considering the data, this position is likely accurate to about 1500 yards.

Chart 2

Patrol

Turning to an earlier time, we are told that at 1205 hrs MTB 914 was ordered toward El Arish at maximum speed, from a position 50 nautical miles from El Arish. We are given a detailed explanation of the capabilities of the MTB's and are told that they were making speed of 36 to 38 knots. From the time they headed toward El Arish until they made first radar contact with the Liberty there was an elapsed time of 1 hour and 36 minutes. Using the lower speed of 36 knots, MTB 914 should have traveled 57.6 nautical miles during that period.

MTB 914's position when ordered to El Arish can be described by an arc with a 50 Nautical mile radius centered at El Arish. By measuring the distance from their position at 1341 hrs to any point on the 50 nautical mile arc, we find that at 1205 hrs MTB 914 was no further than 31 nautical miles from the position at which they made first radar contact with the Liberty. (See Chart 3) In this extreme case they were only 53 minutes from the position it took them 1 hour and 36 minutes to reach. If the patrol of MTB 914 occurred as it was described in The Liberty Incident they should have reached their 1342 hr position and made first radar contact 43 minutes earlier than they did.

Chart 3

What is the impact of all this? Certainly this analysis sheds no new light on what actually occurred on June 8th. But it does expose very clearly that the facts presented in The Liberty Incident simply do not hold up. This event did not happen the way Cristol says it did. His facts are flawed. Therefore, his conclusions are unsupported and in turn, are equally flawed.

One If By Air, Two If By Sea

The Liberty Incident attempts to refute the long held contention that the attacks from both air and sea were a well orchestrated, coordinated attack by two branches of the Israeli military. Cristol concludes that the attacks from both air and sea were spontaneous- the result of reaction to events as they occurred.

He describes in great detail a rivalry between the service branches and the events leading up to fateful mistakes by the Israeli radar operator and the Israeli CIC officer that resulted in MTB 914 making a reactionary call for air support at 1347 hrs.

As presented earlier, Cristol describes the patrol of MTB 914 as follows:

1205 hrs. MTB 914, still in the vicinity of Ashdod, is ordered southwest toward El Arish, 50 miles away, at maximum speed. At this time MTB 914 is not informed why it has been ordered to El Arish.

1330 hrs MTB 914 is informed that El Arish is being shelled from the sea.

1341 hrs MTB 914 makes initial radar contact with the Liberty. By means of radar it is determined that the Liberty is heading west, making 30 knots at a range of about 22 nautical miles.

1347 hrs MTB 914 calls for air support.

In presenting this series of events Cristol attempts to portray a torpedo boat squadron frustrated and embarrassed by not having seen combat action. He claims the use of aircraft was never planned and that they called for air support only as a last resort, because they mistakenly believed they could not overtake the Liberty on their own.

Cristol sources this information from the "official version of the State of Israel." This official version came in a report from the Israel Defense Forces History Department. Incredibly, critical information in the official Israeli version is left out of Cristol's version.

As shown above, we are told that at 1330 hrs "MTB 914 is informed that El Arish is being shelled from the sea." This information also appears in Cristol's "TIME LINE" which he presents in his web site for this book.

But he fail to inform us that this same information had already been given to MTB 914 at 1317 hrs. This (1317 hr) information is provided in his "TIME LINE" as it is in the actual IDF History Report. But the official Israeli version provides additional information which Cristol has left out of both his "TIME LINE" and his book. AT 1317 hrs the commander of the MTB squadron was informed that as soon as the "target" was located, aircraft would be dispatched and that he was ordered to make contact with the aircraft when they arrived.

In fact, the decision to send both aircraft and the torpedo boats was made at 1205 hrs in a joint decision of the air force and naval representative. This information is found in the Yerushalmi Report (the foundation of the IDF History Report) and is referred to(without time reference) in the IDF History Report. Cristol had access to this information but did not reveal it.

The spontaneous action theory fails in total. In it's own reports, the State of Israel admits that the use of both air and naval forces was planned and coordinated a full hour and a half before MTB 914 first detected the Liberty. The absence of this information from The Liberty Incident could only have been intentional.

2. Identification of the USS Liberty

Gun Photos

A series of gun camera photos (pg 78/79) are presented for the purpose of demonstrating that the Liberty's U.S. flag was not readily visible. The photos were taken by Kursa flight leader during his second pass at the Liberty. Cristol describes the photos as showing that smoke from the fires on the Liberty's decks is rising straight up. His stated logic is that if the smoke is rising straight up, it follows that the flag must be hanging straight down and would therefore not be visible to a fast moving plane.

While it is possible that the original film or prints are of such quality to allow such an observation. As the photos appear in the book, they do not. The poor quality photos of black smoke against a nearly black background simply do not support the observations presented by Cristol. (See Photo 1)

Photo 1

We can however, fabricate a more discernable view of billowing smoke by using cotton balls against a white background. In a photo taken from about the same position as the subject gun photos, we see that the simulated smoke does appear to be rising straight up. (See Photo 2)

Photo 2

But photos do not always give an accurate representation of reality. By examining the same simulation photographed from a different angle, it is clear that the bellowing smoke rises straight up and is than swept away. (See Photo 3)

Photo 3

That smoke may have been rising straight up from the inferno of a gasoline fire should be no surprise. The fact that hot gases rise is basic science. Therefore, rising smoke alone is not evidence that there was not enough breeze across Liberty's flag to keep it standing out. At the time the gun photos were taken, the Liberty was steaming at least 8 knots on her way to flank speed, easily enough speed to keep her flag standing straight out.

It clearly follows, that even if the gun photos were of adequate quality, they could not possibly support Cristol's logic.

The gun photos do however, allow us to discern a large amount of spray coming off the starboard bow with a lack of spray off the port bow. This is clear evidence that the Liberty was in the process of turning to starboard at a moderate speed. This confirms the report that the Liberty turned to the north following initiation of the attack.

En route to Valleta, Malta

A photo of the Liberty en route to Valleta, Malta (Ch. 13) is presented to demonstrate that from a distance, in the Liberty's smaller stern numerals, the "G" could easily be mistaken as a "C". (See Photo 4)

Photo 4

This is one point upon which we can agree. At a distance, the "G" in Liberty's smaller stern numerals, can be mistaken "C". But what is even more important and conveniently is not mentioned, is that at a distance, even the smaller stern numerals are easily and positively recognizable as not Arabic and therefore not an Egyptian vessel. Cristol makes it clear (chapter 4) that even the Israeli pilots, who were not at all familiar with ships, were well aware that Egyptian ships are identified with Arabic characters.

This photo demonstrates inarguably, that with even the most superficial attempt to identify the Liberty, it would be impossible to identify it as an Egyptian vessel.

But this photo shows even more than the Liberty's stern numerals. In this photo, smoke from the Liberty's stack is clearly rising straight up, while at the same time, her pennants and flag are standing straight out. This contradicts the logic Cristol attempts to make with the gun photos, that smoke rising straight up means that the flag would be hanging limp.

USS Liberty the day after the attack

Cristol offers a photo (Ch. 13) of the Liberty the day after the attack to show that the 7 x 13 foot flag is small when compared to the overall size of the ship. Surely this does not come as a surprise to anyone. The Liberty was longer than one and a half football fields. Is Cristol suggesting the flag should have been 100 feet long? No where in his book does he claim that the Liberty was sited for displaying a flag smaller than the US Navy determines to be acceptable for use underway. Instead of comparing the flag to the size of the Liberty, compare it to the size of the large rescue helicopter hovering over the forecastle. Cristol's self proclaimed objectivity disintegrates as he creates excuses to support his conclusions. He would do well to simply present the facts and let them speak for themselves. Cristol digs really deep for this argument. (See Photo 5)

Photo 5

What is most interesting in this photo is that the flag (not to small to be visible) is standing straight out in spite of the fact that the ship is obviously standing dead in a calm sea. (Another contradiction to the limp flag theory.)

In his description of the attack, he calls attention to the fact that MTB 914 approached from the starboard side and the flag was on the port halyard- "...which was on the other side of the ship from the approaching Israeli MTB's." He implies that "on the other side of the ship" the flag could not be seen.

At the time of the torpedo attack, the Liberty had surely reached at least 15 knots. At this speed the smoke from fires not yet extinguished or still smoldering would surely be left behind, leaving the flag clearly visible. This photo, taken from the starboard side, leaves no doubt. The flag was clearly and easily visible by any MTB approaching from either side; To claim otherwise is an insult to anyone and everyone's' intelligence.

3. Manipulations and Deceptions

Smoke and Mirrors

Through out The Liberty Incident author Cristol makes use of the skills he developed through many years as a lawyer and Judge. He manipulates language, twists facts and otherwise presents subjects in such a way as to create a new reality. He makes suggestions of what might have happened and then writes about them as if they did happen. In the end, he creates history so that events support his conclusions.

We will now examine a few examples of how the author manipulates facts to fit his conclusions.

Who's On First, What's On Second

In Chapter 16 Cristol uses his skills to twist facts so that they create false logic that can lead to incorrect conclusions. He writes:

"While the Liberty was en route to her patrol area, three significant events took place. First, the United States publicly announced to the world on June 6 at the UN Security Council that it did not have any carriers or aircraft within hundreds of miles of Egypt and Israel. This was only true on the day of the announcement. Liberty was still two days away, sailing across the Mediterranean toward Point Alpha."

This can only have importance to establish an excuse why the IDF would be justified in assuming that the Liberty's operating area (the area in which she was attacked) was clear of US ships at the time of the attack. But Cristol has already established that (on the morning of the attack) the Liberty's neutral marker was removed from the Israeli Navy's tactical plotting table because the information was already five hours old and therefore useless. He cannot have it both ways. If information five hours old is useless, than information that is 48 hours old is even more useless. In reality, the announcement to the UN Security Council would have been true even if the Liberty had already reached at point Alpha on June 6th, unless of course the Liberty could be mistaken for an aircraft carrier as easily as she was for horse carrier. He continues:

"Second, at 0745 on Monday, June 5, 1967 war began."

Since when does June 6th occur before June 5th? Is this some attempt to create an illusion that Israel began the war only after the announcement that there were no US carriers or aircraft in the area? This error is so obvious, it is difficult to believe it was not intentional. He completes the trilogy with:

"Third, on June 7, almost three days after the commencement of fighting, the U.S. National Security Agency determined it was not safe for the Liberty to be fourteen miles from the beach of the Sinai, in the midst of a major combat area, . . ."

Pure "poetic license"! In footnote 7 (referencing this statement) for this chapter Cristol states "The specific official reason(s) that the NSA made the initial request [to move the Liberty] are not known." If the reasons were not known, then it follows that the reason given in the main body of the text (quoted above) is a creation of the author's imagination.

Liberty's 1300 hr Position

As part of a discussion as to why the Israeli navy requested air support , Cristol takes issue (note 19, chapter 4) with the position of the Liberty as it was reported in the ships deck log. He determines through "interpolation", that if the Liberty steamed her assigned course and speed from her position logged at 1200 hrs., her 1300 hr position should have been 31° 22.2'N 33° 36.1'E.

First of all, his extrapolated position is incorrect! If the Liberty steamed her assigned course and speed from 1200 hrs to 1300 hrs., she would have traveled 5 nautical miles on a course of 283° from her position at 1200 hrs. (See Chart 4) But Cristol places her just over 4 nautical miles along a course of 270° (due west).

Chart 4

It's possible that the author is attempting to discredit the professionalism of the Liberty's officers and the logs they maintained. And we can also surmise that this is an attempt to create a mental image that the Liberty was steaming due west, a theme that is repeated on a number of occasions throughout the book -- an image that the "mysterious" ship was running west, toward Port Said. That is, the Liberty was an Egyptian ship, running for home.

In the end, Cristol was wrong and failed to show that anything was inaccurate with this entry in the Liberty's log. The only thing he was able to discredit was his own work and in turn his book.

Extrapolation also allows the determination that at 1130 hrs, the Liberty was positioned at 31° 21.65'N & 33° 43.9'E. The 1130 hrs position of the Liberty will be used in another discussion. (See Chart 5)

Chart 5

Sink the Liberty

In various places in his book, Cristol is most emphatic that Israeli forces were not trying and had no intentions, to actually sink the USS Liberty.

Early on, he describes the torpedoes and the inability of the Israeli navy to deliver such ordinance to a target. He explains that the order was given to launch 6 torpedoes at the Liberty, any one of which would be expected to have the ability to sink the ship. And he then implies that ordering the 6 torpedoes was not an attempt to sink the Liberty. Does he expect us to believe that the sailors on the MTB's were trying to miss when they launched 5 torpedoes and that the one that hit the mark was actually an accident? Since when does failure to succeed equate with lack of intent?

This argument reaches its climax on pg. 189 when he writes "Any analysis of these facts must conclude that if Israel had really wanted to sink the Liberty, it would have done just that."

Were or were not the Israeli forces trying to sink the Liberty? The answer appears in the transcript of the Israeli audiotapes (appendix to the book). As follows:

Menachem, Chief Air Controller at Israel's Air Control South: "[Kislev], she's burning. The minute Kursa is finished, we're sending in Royal." Kislev, Chief Air Contoller at the Kirya: "Right. Sink her." Menachem: "Sink her. Okay."

It appears that this exchange settles the question of intent.

Deception Through Irrelevance

One of the approaches Cristol uses in his book is to present bits of seemingly unimportant information like pieces of a puzzle. When these pieces are fit together, they are supposed to create a large picture that will support the conclusions the author makes. This is not a bad approach if only the individual bits of information are valid. In this book, the information is all too often not valid. An example of this is Cristol's discussion on the torpedo attack on the Liberty.

In the middle of page 55, Cristol writes a preface to the graphic he presents on the following page. He writes:

"The graphic of the torpedo attack was prepared on the basis an interview of the commanding officer of MTB 203, who told this author that Liberty had turned to the north and the MTBs attacked on a westerly heading. Commander McGonagle testified that the Liberty maintained a heading of 283°, which is 13° north of west. In either situation the MTBs would have had some sun in their eyes during the torpedo run. It is possible that Liberty was steering a little more north of west than her skipper remembered following the air attack, and it is also possible that the MTB commander was incorrect in his recollection. The difference in headings is not considered significant. Notwithstanding the precise headings of Liberty and the MTBs, the attack was carried out essentially in the manner depicted in the graphic."

Just exactly what is Cristol saying in this confusing discourse?

He begins by telling us that the graphic is based on recollections of an incident from more than 20 years in the past. (In other sections of the books he tells us that such recollections are not reliable.) He then relates the official version of what happened as reported by the Liberty's commanding officer just days after the attack. He then attempts to subvert the captains' report in a most confusing manner. (In other sections of the book Cristol relies on the captains testimony as factual.) He describes a course of 283° as being "north of west" (In another section of the book he describes a course of 283° as being "west toward Port Said".) He then suggests that maybe they were "... steering a little more north...".

This all seems to be a desperate attempt to portray the MTBs attacking directly into the sun -- possibly to support the contention that the MTBs could not see identifying markings on the Liberty. (See Graphic 1)

Graphic 1

If we consider the official version (by the Liberty's commanding officer) the Liberty was steaming a course of 283° (almost directly into the sun) and the MTBs attacked from a northerly direction with the sun to their starboard side. This official version is depicted in a computer manipulation of Cristol's graphic. (See Graphic 2)

Graphic 2

If you still tend to favor Cristol's version of the graphic, you should consider the question; why would the MTBs attack directly into the sun? If they believed they were attacking the El Quiser, then they also knew it was virtually harmless and that they had more than three times its maximum speed? If they really believed all this, they also knew they could literally, run circles around their target. Who gives up the sun at their back?

[Editor's note: It is important to point out that forensic analysis has shown that McGonagle's recollection is not accurate. Regardless, the sun would not have made a big difference, and the fact that Cristol tries hard to face the MTBs into the sun show how ill-conceived his arguments are.]

Epilogue

Summary

Talk about friendly fire incidents, talk about fighting between branches of the military or talk about no provable motive; none of this means a thing. What is important is the ability to form conclusions based on the facts presented of what actually occurred on June 8, 1967.

The author presents a minute-by-minute account of the events of June 8, 1967. We have demonstrated that this account could not have happened as it is presented.

The author presents photos and uses them to explain the how and why of June 8, 1967. We have demonstrated that these photos not only fail to support these claims, they actually contradict them.

The author deluges us with tale after tale of events related to June 6, 1967. We have demonstrated how he uses his skills to distort the truth and confuse the issues.

This book has failed to keep its promise. This did not close the book on June 8, 1967. It opened Pandora's box.

Things That Make You Go Hmmm...

It was established by extrapolation, that at 11:30 hrs, the USS Liberty was positioned at 31° 21.65' N 33°43.9' E. And at 13:41 hrs, the time of first radar contact, MTB squadron 914 was at position 31°28.98' N 33°58.47' E. By drawing a straight line from the position of the USS Liberty at 11:30 hrs. Through the position of MTB 914 at 1341 hrs., the result is a direct plot to the port of Ashdod.

Is it a coincidence that MTB 914 made first radar contact with the USS Liberty from a position located on a straight line course between Ashdod and the position of the USS Liberty at the time MTB 914 departed Ashdod? Did MTB 914 leave the immediate area of Ashdod on a direct course towards the Liberty's then current position? Or was it merely a remarkable coincidence that MTB 914 ended up at that specific spot in the more than 2000 square nautical miles that make up the eastern corner of the Mediterranean sea? (See Chart 6)

Chart 6